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Abstract
In response to Eugene Matusov’s article in this journal, Kritt addresses assumptions of the large-scale
testing central to NCLB. Discussion of studies of urban kindergarten children that examine cognitive
variability, including the assertion of ability, focuses on how this affects the student as a learner, as
well as a teacher. In contrast, Matusov questions root assumptions of schooling, casting engagement
in socially valued activities as an issue of human rights. This view is criticized as overly socialized. It is
argued that surface-level functioning in a cultural context is not sufficient for full participation in a
democracy.

T

he acrid rhetoric of educational politics
certainly did not begin with No Child Left Behind
(NCLB). But the Bush administration’s provocation
in introducing NCLB—citing “the soft bigotry of low expectations” (U.S. Department of Education, 2003)—shifted the dialogue
about educational policy to cast those currently teaching, and
especially their unions, as the primary enemy. Eugene Matusov
(2011) takes the 2001 NCLB law at its face value, as the place to
“start a discussion about an alternative, genuine, sociocultural
vision of failure-free education” (p. 7). My engagement in that
discussion is grounded in practices in urban schools, the gap
between how children actually learn and what tests measure, and a
radically different interpretation of what tests reveal. Matusov and
I agree that testing fails to capture thinking at its best, and it
certainly should not be guiding instruction. And we generally
share a sociocultural perspective. But I believe he presents an
overly socialized viewpoint and so, we arrive at somewhat different
conclusions.
A brief history reveals some of the assumptions of large-scale
testing. The original impetus for intelligence tests was educational
placement of what, today, we often call special-ed students. The
initial widespread use of intelligence tests was in the military
during World War I, to determine who should be sent for specialized training, for example, in communications, leaving those not
selected to do more routine and mundane tasks. In its long and
ignoble history, so-called intelligence testing has also been used as
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an exclusionary tool to restrict immigration and eligibility to vote
and as a justification for proposed eugenics programs. In these
cases, the negative implications of testing for democracy can be
clearly seen. In educational practice, this is less evident but of no
less serious concern.
The logic of testing has been to try to pass everyone through
the same sieve. All individuals are expected to answer the same set
of questions to demonstrate proficiency at the same mental tasks.
This is rife with assumptions of homogeneity, both in the population and in the requirements of jobs and careers. In educational
settings, intelligence testing and achievement testing have been
used for sorting students into ability groups. Some students are
identified as having deficits requiring placement in specialeducation classrooms. Others are tracked into classes with students
of similar proficiency levels in reading, math, or science.
Matusov questions two common statistical gambits used in
reporting test results. One is normalization. A common standard is
set for all children, but criteria for passing may be adjusted to
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ensure that the range of performance fits a normal curve, with
some students surpassing the mean and some students failing.
Although the tails of the distribution contain relatively few
individuals, the competitive assumptions are anathema to
Matusov. In a similar vein, he objects to the goal of closing achievement gaps, because it implicitly accepts proportional success/
failure among social groups (e.g., Black-White, male-female,
rich-poor); in other words, some within each group are expected to
fall below the mean.
In several studies of urban kindergarten children (Kritt, 2004;
Kritt, under review; Kritt & Shulman, in preparation), I examined
cognitive variability in a more fine-grained manner. Using
disaggregated testing data to look at individual performance (i.e., a
collection of quantitative case studies) allowed for interrogation of
the assumption that there is a relatively homogeneous mass of
students with moderate abilities. A central debate regarding
intelligence has focused on whether it is a general factor, so that
we’d expect a person to have many talents in seemingly unrelated
areas, or one that is domain specific. In the past, it was more
common among psychologists to view a person as generally
intelligent or not (Buckhalt, 2002; Carroll, 1991; Humphreys, 1979;
Kranzler & Jensen, 1991). This idea has stuck among the general
public, and may be at least partially due to a bias in social cognition, so if a person is good in one thing we simply assume he or she
is good in many things. For example, Einstein was also, reportedly,
a pretty good violinist, and comedian Steve Martin is also an actor,
author, and musician. However, psychologists have increasingly
recognized that many talents are domain specific (Gardner, 1983;
Ceci, 1990). This may be due to either nature or nurture or, most
likely, some combination of the two.
The findings of the aforementioned studies, that there is a
great deal of variability in an individual’s test performance across
several areas (verbal, mathematical, perceptual-performance,
memory), support an assertion by Gould (1981) that the statistical
ideal of the average student, with abilities near the mean in all skill
areas, is not representative of actual individuals. It is an important
point because increasing numbers of students have difficulties in
school that are subsequently labeled (e.g., as learning, attention,
and behavior disorders). Now, all this diagnosis of children might
be due to greatly improved diagnostic techniques. But Gould
suggested in a later book (1996) that children never were uniform
in their abilities. And Howard Gardner (1991) argued that schools
have failed to adequately educate the vast majority of students.
Several implications for educational practice are rather
obvious. Foremost, teachers should recognize a wide range of
individual proficiencies and goals and facilitate their development.
Progressive educators encourage students learning while being
involved in rich inquiry (e.g., projects), as well as emphasize
authentic assessment that is part of meaningful classroom activities (e.g., Allen, 1998; Camp, 1990; Grigorenko & Sternberg, 1998;
Kritt, 1993; Paris et al., 1992; Wiggins, 1989, 1998; Wolf, 1989).
It must be recognized that testing is an imposed and decontextualized task with no intrinsic meaning to the test taker, only
instrumental value, as a means to some rather abstract academicachievement goal. Some students may embrace this imposed goal
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as part of an achievement ideology (i.e., belief that doing well in
school leads directly to doing well in life), but many, especially in
urban populations, reject it (e.g., MacLeod, 1987/2008).
Rather than summative assessments that serve actuarial
functions for politicians, assessment can be formative, so that it
contributes to student learning and development. Vygotsky’s
(1978) zone of proximal development (ZPD) is a prime example of
assessment that could be useful to adults (parents and teachers)
truly concerned with student learning (Kozulin, 2005; Rogoff,
1990; Wertsch, 1985). Instead of stopping the assessment with a
child’s answer to a question, the process continues to determine
what the child can do with cuing and gentle assistance. The
distance between what the child can do alone and what can be done
with assistance is the ZPD. Educational efforts (e.g., scaffolding)
are targeted here.
Consideration of some classic issues in intelligence help us to
further understand the way students are characterized and
educated. One is whether intelligence is inherited or dependent on
the environment. A famous family, the Huxleys, illustrates why it is
a thorny issue. The grandfather was a biologist and an early
defender of Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution. His grandsons
included: Sir Julian Huxley, a noted biologist; Aldous, the author of
Brave New World, The Doors of Perception, and other novels; and
little brother Andrew, who received the Nobel Prize in physiology
and medicine for his work on activity in the central nervous
system. I think it is safe to say they had good genes, but also they
undoubtedly benefitted greatly from growing up in a stimulating
family, being brought up in a way that encouraged curiosity and
creativity. It is virtually impossible to separate genetic and environmental influences, with notable exceptions being studies of
identical twins separated at birth. Focusing primarily on genetic
inheritance ratifies not only privilege but also the futility of
educating problem students. The faulty logic of arguments such as
Hernnstein & Murray’s (1994), that the current distribution of
performance on IQ tests is indicative of hereditary differences
between races in intelligence, serves to justify existing economic
hierarchies (Fischer, Janowski, Lucas, Swidler, & Voss, 1998; Jacoby
& Glauberman, 1995). Furthermore, it suggests that patterns of
placement in schools, employment, status, and power reflect
inherent differences in brains, rather than socially constructed and
maintained divisions.
Another classic issue regarding intelligence is perhaps even
more to the point. The assertion of ability refers to a hypothetical
construct used to justify expectations. It is a useful concept if we
want to talk about prediction of future performance in a variety of
areas, ranging from educational achievement to employment and
career to general well-being (cf. Sternberg, 1997). But that quickly
becomes problematic (Riegel, 1976). As educators, we have a
responsibility to provide optimal conditions for children to
develop their talents. Yet we can observe and measure only what
children have actually done. These instances of performance may,
of course, differ according to contextual factors, testing conditions,
and emotional factors. Even if a child is repeatedly tested under less
than optimal conditions, and repeatedly performs poorly, it may be
inaccurate to assert that the child lacks ability. Rather, we must
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acknowledge that the child cannot perform under certain conditions. And it is important to remember that the acontextual
presentation of problems in a testing situation stands in stark
contrast to the highly contexted character of activities that individuals perform in the real world and find meaningful.
What does it mean to say someone has potential? The person
has never done it, whatever “it” is, yet we state that he or she could
do it. That is not exactly the same as saying we expect that child to
do it. Parents have dreams for their children. Affluent parents can
more easily do more than poor parents to give their children
second and third chances. It is not just a curious coincidence that
both test scores and academic performance have repeatedly been
shown to correlate with parental income. From a social Darwinist
perspective, this is readily accepted as confirming the logic of the
hierarchical structure of society. Those of a less severe bent are
likely to seek an explanation in the effects of poverty.
If students from more affluent families are viewed in terms of
their potential and other children viewed only in terms of their
actual performance, they will be treated differently in educational
settings. Teacher expectations can lead to favored treatment in the
classroom that, in turn, contributes to student academic achievement (Alvidrez & Weinstein, 1999; Entwisle & Alexander, 1993).
Differences between which students are most frequently called
upon in class and which are not and among types of feedback given,
as well as possible bias in appraisal of student work are mundane
and often unintentional ways in which this occurs. Yet such
microlevel dialogic processes contribute to macrolevel processes
whereby schools are trading posts where economic and social
privilege are transformed into superior academic performance
(Bourdieu, 1977), which is used to justify superior life opportunities
(cf. Anyon, 1981).
This same phenomenon can also be considered in a very
different way. The use of IQ test results to predict future development is predicated upon implicit assumptions (e.g., emphasis on
inheritance of intelligence, the g factor) about continuity of ability
and the self. The effect of such beliefs on how individuals think of
themselves as learners can influence students, parents, and teachers
in ways that can accentuate the possibility of change or erect
impediments to it.
We tend to view ourselves as others view us (Blumer, 1969;
Mead, 1934/1962). This happens as a natural part of social interaction. If someone treats us as if we are smart and capable, we tend to
give an optimal performance. If we are treated as if we are dumb, we
tend to perform at a lower level than we might otherwise (e.g.,
Steele, 1997). This is not a necessary reaction, and some very
resilient individuals can defy expectations, but those are more the
exception than the rule.
In everyday interactions in most of life’s spheres, the judgment
of others is a subtler process than it is in school. The apotheosis of
being judged is formal labeling in schools. Today it is usually not
blatant, but both labeled individuals and peers recognize it
nonetheless. The labeled individual tends to behave in ways that
confirm the label. That is not because the label is accurate but
because a social dialectic has been set in motion. Adults let a
student know they think the student can’t do something. Either out
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of defiance or out of laziness, that student does not do much. That is
taken as further evidence, and maybe teachers will give the student
easier problems, which are not successfully completed once again.
And so a transactional cycle is set in motion. Such insights inform
several major theories of motivation.
These theories have clear implications for understanding some
extremes of student behavior in the classroom. Weiner (1979; 1986)
focused on how people think about their individual successes and
failures, whether they attribute their success to stable aspects of
themselves, to stable aspects of the outside world, or to transient
aspects either internal or external. Dweck (1986) identified
individuals who think their own abilities are relatively fixed and
others who view their performance as something that can change.
Only the latter individuals consider the time and effort required to
do homework to be worthwhile. Covington (1985) viewed it as the
student’s attempt to protect a sense of self. If intelligence is an
unchanging attribute, then students will use various tactics to avoid
looking like they’re trying, so they will not appear, especially to
peers, as incapable.
Reified ideas about a person’s own intelligence are largely
unwarranted but are frequently established early in an individual’s
school career (e.g., Bandura, 1993; Entwisle & Alexander, 1993).
Such static conceptions can be detrimental to future learning and
development. Even in the absence of tracking, such designations
affect individuals’ concept of themselves as thinkers and learners,
as well as how others (parents, teachers, peers, coworkers) interact
with them. Students who have more fluid ideas about thinking and
learning are more likely to try harder, explore, and be creative.
Behavior is malleable, performance is situation specific, and
an individual’s functioning is best understood in its cultural context
(and sometimes more than one, as with the embedded and
interacting contexts of family, school, community, and macroeconomic forces). Carrying these insights to their logical conclusions,
Matusov (2011) states that it is desirable to create a world where
there is equality of “access to socially valuable practices” (p. 4).
Following critics of the logic of disability, such as McDermott and
Varenne (McDermott, 1993; McDermott & Varenne, 1995; Varenne
& McDermott, 1998), Matusov considers this “an issue of human
rights rather than one of education” (p. 4). And this bold stance
certainly changes the terms of the discussion. By shifting the focus
to “supportive infrastructures” and “policies and practices” and
calling for “distinctive human networks” (cf. Hutchins, 1991; Lave &
Wenger, 1991; Rogoff & Lave, 1984; Salomon, 1993), Matusov
establishes that “learning is only one of many means for access” (p.
4). Citing aspects of the learning process that separate it from
functional daily activity and the importance of communal rather
than individual endeavor, he questions root assumptions of
schooling as we commonly know them.
This focus on an ecology of support is laudable, but problematic in several respects. Matusov’s idealistic assumption of widespread support for failure-free education flies in the face of the very
neoliberal values he critiques. In short, it seems apparent there is
not enough to go around, and most parents want to give their own
children an advantage. Recognizing sources of fundamental
unfairness in capitalist society does not mitigate the deep influences
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upon individual psychology (e.g., self-interest, competitiveness).
There is the world we live in and the world we’d like to live in.
In the process of making his point, Matusov discusses a
number of ideas very familiar to progressive educators (e.g.,
Duckworth, 1987/2006; Langer, 1997; Wells, 1999), including the
need for meaningful context and tasks as well as student involvement in setting goals. He is also perhaps a bit politically incorrect,
but truthful, when he states that “there will always be students who
might not learn” (p. 6). Matusov sets himself apart when he states
that “for these students, not to be behind is to develop other ways
of access to socially and personally valuable practices and activities” (p. 6). For example, he suggests that reading is “one of many
possible ways to access printed texts.” A glib counterexample is that
I had to reread sections of his paper several times to grasp certain
points. Hypothetically, I could have had access to this paper in
aural form, but I am unsure if that would have allowed me to
critically analyze the argument as well as I could using traditional
literacy skills. Similarly, the use of some combination of images
and enactment may have a more powerful impact but afford less
opportunity for reflection and assessment of the message. Indeed,
because modes of communication made possible by information
and communication technologies are so immediate, it is more
difficult to hold their messages at arm’s length and peruse them.
Accordingly, some measures that might ensure education is failure
free might also remove thought from the enterprise of engaging in
socially valued activities.
Although ostensibly the same results might be achieved in
some easier way, there is a difference between a surface-level
performance and a deep and flexible understanding. Reading a
plot synopsis is not equivalent to reading great literature. Being
able to estimate the total for items scanned in a checkout line is a
useful skill. Knowing enough history to evaluate pronouncements
about the war in Afghanistan adds valuable perspective to simply
seeing a report on CNN. And having the critical skills to compare
the speeches of politicians makes a person a better informed voter
(i.e., “having all the input” is not sufficient).
At best, as in pursuit of a hobby, learning is largely intrinsically motivated and self-directed. But students must demonstrate
competence in a range of domains in order to graduate from high
school and pursue advanced training or education. Those who
favor a standardized education, hoping it will lead to very similar
outcomes, will inevitably be disappointed. For even with comparable instruction and a level playing field, such an education is
likely to have differing effects. What students can make of their
education is dependent upon the prior experiences and frameworks they bring to it. A chess master viewing a chess match, an
accomplished musician at the symphony, a chef eating a meal—all
can find significance (and learn) in ways that the rest of us cannot.
Even presented with identical situations, everyone does not benefit
in identical ways. There can be multiple outcomes and there can be
more than one pathway to a common outcome (cf. Werner,
1926/1948).
Fully aware of all the constraints and injustices of the world, as
an educator and as a teacher of teachers, I have a primary objective:
I want young people to have options in life. This does not always
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require merely academic skills. Nor, as Matusov suggests, is it
simply being able to do what everyone else can (cf. a Turing test for
the illiterate or innumerate). It certainly does require a welldeveloped facility in questioning what is presented and thinking
outside the box when necessary. Access and equality may be steps
in this direction, but they are not sufficient preparation for full
participation in a democracy.
Matusov’s analysis is ultimately based upon material dialectics. In these times of emphasis on market forces in education (e.g.,
charter schools), this is a fresh and provocative perspective. Yet a
more cognitive perspective upon cultural-historical activity theory
(i.e., informed by Vygotsky’s writing on scientific concepts,
1934/1987, as well as by Friere, 1970/1986) suggests that psychological change is not automatic and contingent upon material conditions. Rather, generalization, systematization, and understanding
of abstract principles are necessary for people to become truly
conscious, in the sense of being able to reflect upon their own
behavior and thought. In addition to preserving some of the best
values of the educational tradition, this sort of awareness is
necessary for the kind of real choices required for participation in a
democracy. When we work toward creating the conditions for true
and deep understanding that is not divorced from functioning
within the cultural contexts most pertinent to our students, rather
than focusing on improved test performance, we are truly being
accountable as educators.
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